Incentives for pollution control : regulation and(?) or(?) information / Jérôme Foulon, Paul Lanoie, Benoît Laplante

Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environ...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:Foulon, Jérôme
Corporate Authors:World Bank
Other Authors:Laplante, Benoît
Lanoie, Paul
Format: Online-Resource
Language:English
Published:Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Infrastructure and Environment, 2000
Series:Policy research working paper
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Online Access:URL des Erstveröffentlichers
Details
Summary:Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environmental performance also provides strong additional incentives to pollution control
Item Description:"February 2000"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-31)
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2000]
Weitere Ausgabe: Foulon, Jérôme: Incentives for pollution control
Physical Description:1 Online-Ressource (31 Seiten) Illustrationen 28 cm