Incentives for pollution control : regulation and(?) or(?) information / Jérôme Foulon, Paul Lanoie, Benoît Laplante

Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environ...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:Foulon, Jérôme
Autores Corporativos:World Bank
Otros Autores:Laplante, Benoît
Lanoie, Paul
Formato: Online-Resource
Lenguaje:English
Publicado:Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Infrastructure and Environment, 2000
Colección:Policy research working paper
Materias:
Acceso en línea:URL des Erstveröffentlichers
Descripción
Sumario:Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environmental performance also provides strong additional incentives to pollution control
Notas:"February 2000"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-31)
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2000]
Weitere Ausgabe: Foulon, Jérôme: Incentives for pollution control
Descripción Física:1 Online-Ressource (31 Seiten) Illustrationen 28 cm