
Incentives for pollution control : regulation and(?) or(?) information / Jérôme Foulon, Paul Lanoie, Benoît Laplante
Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environ...
Guardado en:
Autores principales: | Foulon, Jérôme |
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Autores Corporativos: | World Bank |
Otros Autores: | Laplante, Benoît Lanoie, Paul |
Formato: | Online-Resource |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: | Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Infrastructure and Environment, 2000 |
Colección: | Policy research working paper
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
Sumario: | Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environmental performance also provides strong additional incentives to pollution control |
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Notas: | "February 2000"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-31) Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2000] Weitere Ausgabe: Foulon, Jérôme: Incentives for pollution control |
Descripción Física: | 1 Online-Ressource (31 Seiten) Illustrationen 28 cm |