
Keefer, P., & World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy. (2001). When do special interests run rampant?: Disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises. World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy.
Chicago Style (17th ed.) CitationKeefer, Philip, and World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy. When Do Special Interests Run Rampant?: Disentangling the Role of Elections, Incomplete Information, and Checks and Balances in Banking Crises. Washington, D.C: World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001.
MLA (8th ed.) CitationKeefer, Philip, and World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy. When Do Special Interests Run Rampant?: Disentangling the Role of Elections, Incomplete Information, and Checks and Balances in Banking Crises. World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001.