
Keefer, P., & World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy. (2001). When do special interests run rampant?: Disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises. World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy.
Citación estilo ChicagoKeefer, Philip, y World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy. When Do Special Interests Run Rampant?: Disentangling the Role of Elections, Incomplete Information, and Checks and Balances in Banking Crises. Washington, D.C: World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001.
Cita MLAKeefer, Philip, y World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy. When Do Special Interests Run Rampant?: Disentangling the Role of Elections, Incomplete Information, and Checks and Balances in Banking Crises. World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001.