
Keefer, P., & World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy. (2001). When do special interests run rampant?: Disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises. World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy.
Style de citation ChicagoKeefer, Philip, et World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy. When Do Special Interests Run Rampant?: Disentangling the Role of Elections, Incomplete Information, and Checks and Balances in Banking Crises. Washington, D.C: World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001.
Style de citation MLAKeefer, Philip, et World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy. When Do Special Interests Run Rampant?: Disentangling the Role of Elections, Incomplete Information, and Checks and Balances in Banking Crises. World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001.