
Keefer, P., & World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy. (2001). When do special interests run rampant?: Disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises. World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy.
Citação norma ChicagoKeefer, Philip, and World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy. When Do Special Interests Run Rampant?: Disentangling the Role of Elections, Incomplete Information, and Checks and Balances in Banking Crises. Washington, D.C: World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001.
Citação norma MLAKeefer, Philip, and World Bank Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy. When Do Special Interests Run Rampant?: Disentangling the Role of Elections, Incomplete Information, and Checks and Balances in Banking Crises. World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001.