Geographic Inequity In A Decentralized Anti-Poverty Program : A Case Study of China / Ravallion, Martin
The central governments of many developing countries have chosen to decentralize their anti-poverty programs, in the expectation that local agents are better informed about local needs. The paper shows that this potential advantage of decentralized eligibility criteria can come at a large cost, to t...
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| Autores principales: | Ravallion, Martin, 1952- |
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| Formato: | Online-Resource |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: | Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2007 |
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| Acceso en línea: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Sumario: | The central governments of many developing countries have chosen to decentralize their anti-poverty programs, in the expectation that local agents are better informed about local needs. The paper shows that this potential advantage of decentralized eligibility criteria can come at a large cost, to the extent that the induced geographic inequities undermine performance in reaching the income- poor nationally. These issues are studied empirically for (probably) the largest transfer-based poverty program in the world, namely China's Di Bao program, which aims to assure a minimum income through means-tested transfers. Poor municipalities are found to adopt systematically lower eligibility thresholds, reducing the program's ability to reach poor areas, and generating considerable horizontal inequity |
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| Notas: | Weitere Ausgabe: Ravallion, Martin: Geographic Inequity In A Decentralized Anti-Poverty Program |
| Descripción Física: | 1 Online-Ressource (33 Seiten) |
