Interlinkage, Limited Liability, and Strategic Interaction

Interlinkage, Limited Liability, and Strategic Interaction / Basu, Kaushik

June 1999 - When will a landlord prefer to supply both land and credit to a tenant rather than allow the lender to borrow from a separate moneylender? The paper shows that if tenancy contracts are obtained prior to contracting with the moneylender, and the tenant has limited liability, interlinked d...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:Basu, Kaushik, 1952-
Autres auteurs:Bell, Clive, 1943-
Bose, Pinaki
Format: Online-Resource
Langue:English
Publié:Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 1999
Sujets:
Amount Of Cred Borrower
Contract Law
Contracts
Contractual Obligations
Credit Contract
Debt Markets
Default
Discount
Discount Rates
Economic Theory and Research
Finance
Finance and Financial Sector Development
Financial Literacy
Instrument
Instruments
Labor Policies
Law and Development
Limited Liability
Loan
Loan Contracts
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
Moneylender
Moral Hazard
Option
Risk Aversion
Risk Neutral
Social Protections and Labor
Unlimited Liability
Accès en ligne:URL des Erstveröffentlichers
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