Incentives for pollution control : regulation and(?) or(?) information / Jérôme Foulon, Paul Lanoie, Benoît Laplante

Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environ...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser:Foulon, Jérôme
Körperschaften:World Bank
Weitere Verfasser:Laplante, Benoît
Lanoie, Paul
Format: Online-Resource
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht:Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Infrastructure and Environment, 2000
Schriftenreihe:Policy research working paper
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Zusammenfassung:Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environmental performance also provides strong additional incentives to pollution control
Beschreibung:"February 2000"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-31)
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2000]
Weitere Ausgabe: Foulon, Jérôme: Incentives for pollution control
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (31 Seiten) Illustrationen 28 cm