Incentives for pollution control : regulation and(?) or(?) information / Jérôme Foulon, Paul Lanoie, Benoît Laplante

Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environ...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:Foulon, Jérôme
Collectivités auteurs:World Bank
Autres auteurs:Laplante, Benoît
Lanoie, Paul
Format: Online-Resource
Langue:English
Publié:Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Infrastructure and Environment, 2000
Collection:Policy research working paper
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Accès en ligne:URL des Erstveröffentlichers
Description
Résumé:Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environmental performance also provides strong additional incentives to pollution control
Description:"February 2000"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-31)
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2000]
Weitere Ausgabe: Foulon, Jérôme: Incentives for pollution control
Description matérielle:1 Online-Ressource (31 Seiten) Illustrationen 28 cm