Incentives for pollution control : regulation and(?) or(?) information / Jérôme Foulon, Paul Lanoie, Benoît Laplante

Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environ...

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Opis bibliograficzny
Główni autorzy:Foulon, Jérôme
organizacja autorów:World Bank
Kolejni autorzy:Laplante, Benoît
Lanoie, Paul
Format: Online-Resource
Język:English
Wydane:Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Infrastructure and Environment, 2000
Seria:Policy research working paper
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Dostęp online:URL des Erstveröffentlichers
Opis
Streszczenie:Both regulation and public disclosure belong in the environmental regulators' arsenal. Strong, clear standards combined with a significant, credible penalty system send the right signals to the regulated community, which responds by lowering pollution emissions. The public disclosure of environmental performance also provides strong additional incentives to pollution control
Deskrypcja:"February 2000"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-31)
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2000]
Weitere Ausgabe: Foulon, Jérôme: Incentives for pollution control
Opis fizyczny:1 Online-Ressource (31 Seiten) Illustrationen 28 cm