How Stronger Patent Protection in India Might Affect the Behavior of Transnational Pharmaceutical Industries / Fink, Carsten
May 2000 - How will stronger patent rights in developing countries affect transnational corporations' behavior in and toward those countries? How will market structure and consumer welfare be affected by extending patent protection to products that could previously be freely imitated? Will rese...
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| Główni autorzy: | Fink, Carsten |
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| Format: | Online-Resource |
| Język: | English |
| Wydane: | Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 1999 |
| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Streszczenie: | May 2000 - How will stronger patent rights in developing countries affect transnational corporations' behavior in and toward those countries? How will market structure and consumer welfare be affected by extending patent protection to products that could previously be freely imitated? Will research-based transnational corporations devote more resources to developing technologies relevant to needs in developing countries? To address questions about how stronger patent rights will affect India's pharmaceutical industry, Fink simulates the effects of introducing such protection - as required by the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) - on market structure and static consumer welfare. (India must amend its current patent regime by 2005 and establish a transitional regime in the meanwhile.) The model Fink uses accounts for the complex demand structure for pharmaceutical goods. Consumers can choose among various drugs available to treat a specific disease. And for each drug, they have a choice among various differentiated brands. Fink calibrates the model for two groups of drugs - quinolonnes and synthetic hypotensives - using 1992 brand-level data. In both groups, a subset of all available drugs was patent-protected in Western Europe but not India, where Indian manufacturers freely imitated them. The simulation analysis asks how the market structure for the two groups of drugs would have looked if India had granted patents for drugs. It does not take account of the fact that stronger patent protection will not apply to existing drugs and that the Indian government might be able to restrain high drug prices by imposing price controls or granting compulsory licenses. |
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| Opis fizyczny: | 1 Online-Ressource (50 Seiten) |
