Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions : When Are Independent Central Banks Irrelevant?

Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions : When Are Independent Central Banks Irrelevant? / Keefer, Philip

March 2000 - Does delegation of policymaking authority to independent agencies improve policy outcomes? This paper reports new theory and tests related to delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank. The authors find that delegation reduces inflation only under specific institutiona...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:Keefer, Philip
Otros Autores:Stasavage, David
Formato: Online-Resource
Lenguaje:English
Publicado:Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 1999
Materias:
Banks and Banking Reform
Central Bank
Central Bank Independence
Central Banks
Checks
Contracts
Credibility
Credibility Problem
Currencies and Exchange Rates
Debt Markets
Default
Discount
Economic Stabilization
Economic Theory and Research
Emerging Markets
Finance
Finance and Financial Sector Development
Financial Literacy
Fixed Investments
Future
Futures
Holding
ICT Applications
Inflation
Inflation Rate
Information and Communication Technologies
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
Monetary Policy
Money Supply
Option
Political Economy
Private Sector Development
Shocks To Income
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