Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments / Philip Keefer, David Stasavage
In economically volatile conditions in which it is more difficult for the public to distinguish inflation deliberately generated by government from inflation created by unanticipated economic shocks, the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence will be unchanged but the effectiveness of...
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| Auteurs principaux: | Keefer, Philip |
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| Collectivités auteurs: | World Bank |
| Autres auteurs: | Stasavage, David |
| Format: | Online-Resource |
| Langue: | English |
| Publié: | Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001 |
| Collection: | Policy research working paper
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| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Résumé: | In economically volatile conditions in which it is more difficult for the public to distinguish inflation deliberately generated by government from inflation created by unanticipated economic shocks, the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence will be unchanged but the effectiveness of exchange rate pegs will be significantly improved. Keefer and Stasavage develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies |
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| Description: | Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 19, 2002 Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2001] Weitere Ausgabe: Keefer, Philip : Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments |
| Description matérielle: | 1 Online-Ressource (46 Seiten) |
