Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments / Philip Keefer, David Stasavage
In economically volatile conditions in which it is more difficult for the public to distinguish inflation deliberately generated by government from inflation created by unanticipated economic shocks, the anti-inflationary effect of central bank independence will be unchanged but the effectiveness of...
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| Główni autorzy: | Keefer, Philip |
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| organizacja autorów: | World Bank |
| Kolejni autorzy: | Stasavage, David |
| Format: | Online-Resource |
| Język: | English |
| Wydane: | Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001 |
| Seria: | Policy research working paper
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| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Lokalizacja | Sygnatura |
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| Institute for Contemporary History (Munich) | Bitte rufen Sie die Einzelbaende auf; dieser Titel ist ein mehrbaendiges Werk. |
| Internet |
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| URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
