When do special interests run rampant? : disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises / Philip Keefer
Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government de...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | Keefer, Philip |
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| Autores Corporativos: | World Bank |
| Formato: | Online-Resource |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: | Washington, D.C : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001 |
| Colección: | Policy research working paper
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Sumario: | Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government decisions that benefit special interest groups, especially government decisions to deal with banking crises. He finds that the better informed the voters, the more proximate elections, and the larger the number of political veto players (conditional on the costs to voters of relevant policy decisions), the smaller the government's fiscal transfers are to the financial sector and the less likely the government is to exercise forbearance in dealing with insolvent financial institutions |
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| Notas: | "February 2001"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 45-47). - Title from title screen as viewed on Sept. 18, 2002 Weitere Ausgabe: Keefer, Philip : When do special interests run rampant? |
| Descripción Física: | 1 Online-Ressource (47 Seiten) |
