The Regulation of Entry

The Regulation of Entry / Porta, Rafael

August 2001 - New data show that countries that regulate the entry of new firms more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods. The evidence supports the view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. Djankov and his coauthors pre...

Szczegółowa specyfikacja

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Opis bibliograficzny
Główni autorzy:Porta, Rafael
Kolejni autorzy:Shleifer, Andrei, 1961-
Silanes de Lopez Djankov, Simeon
Format: Online-Resource
Język:English
Wydane:Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 1999
Hasła przedmiotowe:
Barriers To Entry
Economic Theories
Economic Theory and Research
Economies
Efficiency
Environment
Environmental Economics and Policies
Equity
Externalities
Information
Interest
Labor Policies
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
Market Power
Markets
Need
Outcomes
Policies
Public Sector Economics and Finance
Public Sector Regulation
Regulatory Regimes
Social Protections and Labor
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