
Concession contract renegotiations : some efficiency versus equity dilemmas / Antonio Estache, Lucia Quesada
If having firm-driven renegotiations of contracts for infrastructure services is a major concern, efficiency should not be the only consideration in selecting an operator, indeed, consumers may want to award the concession to a less efficient firm if that would reduce the probability of renegotiatio...
Enregistré dans:
Auteurs principaux: | Estache, Antonio |
---|---|
Collectivités auteurs: | World Bank Institute |
Autres auteurs: | Quesada, Lucia |
Format: | Online-Resource |
Langue: | English |
Publié: | Washington, D.C : World Bank, World Bank Institute, Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division, 2001 |
Collection: | Policy research working paper
|
Sujets: | |
Accès en ligne: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
Résumé: | If having firm-driven renegotiations of contracts for infrastructure services is a major concern, efficiency should not be the only consideration in selecting an operator, indeed, consumers may want to award the concession to a less efficient firm if that would reduce the probability of renegotiation |
---|---|
Description: | "November 2001. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-30). - Title from title screen as viewed on Aug. 24, 2002 Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2001] Weitere Ausgabe: Estache, Antonio: Concession contract renegotiations |
Description matérielle: | 1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten) |