Concession contract renegotiations : some efficiency versus equity dilemmas / Antonio Estache, Lucia Quesada

If having firm-driven renegotiations of contracts for infrastructure services is a major concern, efficiency should not be the only consideration in selecting an operator, indeed, consumers may want to award the concession to a less efficient firm if that would reduce the probability of renegotiatio...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:Estache, Antonio
Collectivités auteurs:World Bank Institute
Autres auteurs:Quesada, Lucia
Format: Online-Resource
Langue:English
Publié:Washington, D.C : World Bank, World Bank Institute, Governance, Regulation, and Finance Division, 2001
Collection:Policy research working paper
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Accès en ligne:URL des Erstveröffentlichers
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Résumé:If having firm-driven renegotiations of contracts for infrastructure services is a major concern, efficiency should not be the only consideration in selecting an operator, indeed, consumers may want to award the concession to a less efficient firm if that would reduce the probability of renegotiation
Description:"November 2001. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-30). - Title from title screen as viewed on Aug. 24, 2002
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2001]
Weitere Ausgabe: Estache, Antonio: Concession contract renegotiations
Description matérielle:1 Online-Ressource (30 Seiten)