Investor Protection, Ownership, and the Cost of Capital

Investor Protection, Ownership, and the Cost of Capital / Love, Inessa

Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love combine the agency theory of the firm with risk diversification incentives for insiders. Principal-agent problems between insiders and outsiders force insiders to retain a larger share in their firm than they would under a perfect risk diversification strategy. The auth...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:Love, Inessa
Autres auteurs:Hubbard, Glenn R.
Himmelberg, Charles P.
Format: Online-Resource
Langue:English
Publié:Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2002
Sujets:
Capital Investment
Capital Stock
Contract
Debt Markets
Economic Theory and Research
Emerging Markets
Equity
Equity Stakes
Finance
Finance and Financial Sector Development
Financial Development
Financial Literacy
Holding
Investment
Investment Decisions
Investment and Investment Climate
Investor
Investor Protection
Labor Policies
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
Microfinance
Political Economy
Private Sector Development
Social Protections and Labor
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