Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? / Erik Feijen
"The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar...
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| Autores principales: | Feijen, Erik, 1977- |
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| Autores Corporativos: | World Bank |
| Formato: | Online-Resource |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: | [Washington, D.C] : World Bank, 2005 |
| Colección: | Policy research working paper
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| Acceso en línea: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Localización | Número de Clasificación |
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| Institute for Contemporary History (Munich) | Bitte rufen Sie die Einzelbaende auf; dieser Titel ist ein mehrbaendiges Werk. |
| Internet |
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| URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
