Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? / Erik Feijen

"The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Main Authors:Feijen, Erik, 1977-
Corporate Authors:World Bank
Formato: Online-Resource
Idioma:English
Publicado em:[Washington, D.C] : World Bank, 2005
Colecção:Policy research working paper
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