Di bao : a guaranteed minimum income in urban China? / Youjuan Wang, Shaohua Chen, Martin Ravallion

"Concerns about incentives and targeting naturally arise when cash transfers are used to fight poverty. The authors address these concerns in the context of China's Di Bao program, which uses means-tested transfers to try to assure that no registered urban resident has an income below a st...

Szczegółowa specyfikacja

Zapisane w:
Opis bibliograficzny
Główni autorzy:Wang, Youjuan
organizacja autorów:World Bank
Kolejni autorzy:Chen, Shaohua, 1955-
Format: Online-Resource
Język:English
Wydane:[Washington, D.C] : World Bank, 2006
Seria:Policy research working paper
Hasła przedmiotowe:
Dostęp online:URL des Erstveröffentlichers
Opis
Streszczenie:"Concerns about incentives and targeting naturally arise when cash transfers are used to fight poverty. The authors address these concerns in the context of China's Di Bao program, which uses means-tested transfers to try to assure that no registered urban resident has an income below a stipulated poverty line. There is little sign in the data of poverty traps due to high benefit withdrawal rates. Targeting performance is excellent by various measures. Di Bao appears to be better targeted than any other program in the developing world. However, all but one measure of targeting performance is found to be uninformative, or even deceptive, about impacts on poverty. The authors find that the majority of the poor are not receiving help, even with a generous allowance for measurement errors. While on paper, Di Bao would eliminate urban poverty, it falls well short of that ideal in practice. "--World Bank web site
Deskrypcja:Includes bibliographical references. - Title from PDF file as viewed on 1/10/2006
Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[2006]
Opis fizyczny:1 Online-Ressource (45 Seiten)