Insurgency And Credible Commitment In Autocracies And Democracies

Insurgency And Credible Commitment In Autocracies And Democracies / Keefer, Philip

This paper suggests a new factor that makes civil war more likely: the inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society. Lacking this ability, both elected and unelected governments pursue public policies that leave citizens less well-off and more prone to revolt....

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:Keefer, Philip
Format: Online-Resource
Langue:English
Publié:Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2007
Sujets:
Armed Conflict
Citizen
Citizens
Civil War
Conflict and Development
Emerging Markets
Ethnic Groups
Finance and Financial Sector Development
Financial Literacy
Governance
Health, Nutrition and Population
Labor Policies
Natural Resources
Parliamentary Government
Policies
Policy
Policy Research
Policy Research Working Paper
Political Parties
Population
Population Policies
Post Conflict Reconstruction
Private Sector Development
Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures
Social Conflict
Social Development
Social Protections and Labor
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