Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement : Are There Any Fringe Bidders?

Bidder Asymmetry In Infrastructure Procurement : Are There Any Fringe Bidders? / Estache, Antonio

Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous in public procurement auctions related to official development projects. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competi...

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Opis bibliograficzny
Główni autorzy:Estache, Antonio
Kolejni autorzy:Iimi, Atsushi
Format: Online-Resource
Język:English
Wydane:Washington, D.C : The World Bank, 2008
Hasła przedmiotowe:
Affiliated
Affiliated organizations
Auction
Auctions
Bid
Bidders
Bidding
Competition
Debt Markets
E-Business
Finance and Financial Sector Development
Government Procurement
Infrastructure Economics
Infrastructure Economics and Finance
International development
Investment and Investment Climate
Macroeconomics and Economic Growth
Markets and Market Access
Private Sector Development
Public disclosure
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