Corruption under moral hazard / Gunnar S. Eskeland, Henrik Thiele
Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits
Zapisane w:
| Główni autorzy: | Eskeland, Gunnar S. |
|---|---|
| organizacja autorów: | World Bank |
| Kolejni autorzy: | Thiele, Henrik, 1967- |
| Format: | Online-Resource |
| Język: | English |
| Wydane: | Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics, 1999 |
| Seria: | Policy research working paper
|
| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Streszczenie: | Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits |
|---|---|
| Deskrypcja: | "October 1999"--Cover. - Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39) Erscheinungsjahr in Vorlageform:[1999] Weitere Ausgabe: Eskeland, Gunnar S: Corruption under moral hazard |
| Opis fizyczny: | 1 Online-Ressource (39 Seiten) Illustrationen 28 cm |
