When do special interests run rampant? : disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises

When do special interests run rampant? : disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises / Philip Keefer

Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government de...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:Keefer, Philip
Corporate Authors:World Bank
Format: Online-Resource
Language:English
Published:Washington, D.C : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001
Series:Policy research working paper
Subjects:
Bank
Mathematisches Modell
Politik
Banks and banking > Political aspects
Financial crises > Mathematical models
Fiscal policy > Mathematical models
Online Access:URL des Erstveröffentlichers
Library Call Number
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Internet
URL des Erstveröffentlichers

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