When do special interests run rampant? : disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises

When do special interests run rampant? : disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises / Philip Keefer

Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government de...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:Keefer, Philip
Autores Corporativos:World Bank
Formato: Online-Resource
Lenguaje:English
Publicado:Washington, D.C : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001
Colección:Policy research working paper
Materias:
Bank
Mathematisches Modell
Politik
Banks and banking > Political aspects
Financial crises > Mathematical models
Fiscal policy > Mathematical models
Acceso en línea:URL des Erstveröffentlichers
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Internet
URL des Erstveröffentlichers

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