When do special interests run rampant? : disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises

When do special interests run rampant? : disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises / Philip Keefer

Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government de...

Description complète

Enregistré dans:
Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:Keefer, Philip
Collectivités auteurs:World Bank
Format: Online-Resource
Langue:English
Publié:Washington, D.C : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001
Collection:Policy research working paper
Sujets:
Bank
Mathematisches Modell
Politik
Banks and banking > Political aspects
Financial crises > Mathematical models
Fiscal policy > Mathematical models
Accès en ligne:URL des Erstveröffentlichers
Localisation Cote
Bitte rufen Sie die Einzelbaende auf; dieser Titel ist ein mehrbaendiges Werk.
Internet
URL des Erstveröffentlichers

Documents similaires