When do special interests run rampant? : disentangling the role of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances in banking crises / Philip Keefer
Government responses to banking crises are less likely to favor special interest groups when elections are near, voters are better informed about the costs of inefficient government decisions, and governments have multiple veto players. Keefer investigates the political determinants of government de...
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| Main Authors: | Keefer, Philip |
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| Corporate Authors: | World Bank |
| Formato: | Online-Resource |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado em: | Washington, D.C : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and Competition Policy, 2001 |
| Colecção: | Policy research working paper
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| Acesso em linha: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Localização | Área/Cota |
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| Institute for Contemporary History (Munich) | Bitte rufen Sie die Einzelbaende auf; dieser Titel ist ein mehrbaendiges Werk. |
| Internet |
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| URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
