Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? / Erik Feijen
"The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar...
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| Główni autorzy: | Feijen, Erik, 1977- |
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| organizacja autorów: | World Bank |
| Format: | Online-Resource |
| Język: | English |
| Wydane: | [Washington, D.C] : World Bank, 2005 |
| Seria: | Policy research working paper
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| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Lokalizacja | Sygnatura |
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| Institute for Contemporary History (Munich) | Bitte rufen Sie die Einzelbaende auf; dieser Titel ist ein mehrbaendiges Werk. |
| Internet |
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| URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
